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Abstract
In recent years there has been a great deal of work done on secret sharing schemes. Secret
Sharing Schemes allow for the division of keys so that an authorised set of users may access
information. In this paper we wish to present a critical comparison of two of these Schemes
based on Latin Squares [3] and RSA [9]. These two protocols will be examined in terms of their
positive and negative aspects of their security.
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1 Introduction
In communications networks which require security, it is important that secrets be protected by
more than one key. Furthermore a system of several keys with more than one way for their com-
bination may allow for the unique recovery of a secret. Schemes that have a group of participants
that could recover a secret are known as Secret Sharing Schemes.
The idea of secret sharing is to start with a secret, divide it into pieces called shares, which are
then distributed amongst users such that the pooled shares are specific subsets of users allowed to
reconstruct the original secret, [6].
Threshold Schemes
Shamir [8], describes threshold schemes as being very helpful in the management of cryptographic
keys. The most secure key management scheme keeps the key in a single place. This sort of scheme
may not always be appropriate, and an obvious solution to this may be to make multiple copies of
the key. This may increase the risk associated in keeping multiple keys secret. By using Shamir’s
[8] threshold scheme concept we can get a very robust key management scheme.
Threshold schemes are well suited to applications in which a group of individuals with conflicting
interests must cooperate [8]. By following Shamir’s [8] protocol and choosing the correct t and
w parameters we can give any sufficiently large majority the authority to take some action while
giving any sufficiently large minority veto powers. We shall now use the definition outlined in [10]
to describe what a threshold secret sharing scheme is.
Definition 1.1. Let t and w be positive integers, t ≤ w. A (t, w)−threshold scheme is a method of
sharing a key K among a set of w players (denoted by P), in such a way that any t participants
can compute the value of K, but no group of t− 1 participants can do so.
The value of K is chosen by a special participant which is referred to by [10] as the dealer. The
dealer is denoted by D and we must assume that D /∈ P. When D wants to share the key K
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among the participants in P, D gives each participant some partial information referred to earlier
as a share. The shares should be distributed secretly, so no participant knows the share given to
any other participant. At some later time, a subset of participants B ⊆ P will pool their shares or
return them to the dealer in an attempt to compute the key K. If |B| ≥ t, then they should be
able to compute the value of K as a function of the shares they collectively hold. Furthermore if
|B| < t, then they should not be able to compute K. If we follow the notation of Stinson [10],
P = {Pi : 1 ≤ i ≤ w} (1.1)
as the set of participants, K is the set of keys and S as the set of secrets. A useful point proposed
by Shamir [8] is that a hierarchical scheme may be created, so that some players may have shares
which are of more importance (weight).
1.1 Access Structures
In our outline of threshold schemes, we wanted t out of w players to be able to determine the
key. A more general situation is to specifically exactly which subsets of players should be able to
determine the key and those that should not [10]. If we describe Γ as being a set of subsets of P,
and the subsets in Γ as being the subset of players that should be able to compute the key. Γ is
denoted as being the access structure and the subsets in Γ are called authorised subsets.
Furthermore if we let K be the set of keys and S be the share set. We shall continue to use the
dealer D who wants to share a key k ∈ K, and then gives each player a share S ∈ S. Some time
later a subset of players will attempt to determine K from the shares they collectively hold. If
we notice that a (t, w)-threshold scheme creates the access structure {B ⊆ P| |B| ≥ t}, which is
referred to by Stinson [10] as the threshold access structure.
If Γ is an access structure, then B ∈ Γ is a minimal authorized subset and A /∈ Γ whenever
A ⊆ B,A 6= B. The set of minimal authorized subsets of Γ is denoted by Γ0 and is called the basis
of Γ. Since Γ consists of all subsets of P that are supersets of a subset in the basis Γ0. Thus Γ is
determined uniquely as a function of Γ0 such that:
Γ = {C ⊆ P, B ⊆ C, B ∈ Γ0} (1.2)
2 Latin Squares
In their 1994 paper Cooper, Donovan and Seberry [3] laid the foundation for the use of critical sets
as a combinatorial structure which could be used to construct a secret sharing scheme. We should
begin this section by defining a Latin Square and the concept of a critical set.
Definition 2.1. A n× n Latin Square is an n× n matrix whose entries are taken from a set of n
objects so that no object occurs twice in any row or column.
Definition 2.2. A critical set of a Latin Square L defined over the set X = {1, . . . , n} where,
C = {(i, j, k) ∈ X ×X ×X} (2.1)
such that L is the only square of order n with i in the (j, k)th for every (i, j, k) ∈ C. Furthermore
no proper subset of C may satisfies this condition
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An important construction which we need to define is the concept of a strong critical set for a Latin
Square.
Definition 2.3. A critical set L is a strong critical set if there exists a set {P1, . . . , Pm} of m =
n2 − ‖A‖ partitions of order n, which satisfy the following properties:
• L ⊃ Pm ⊃ Pm−1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ P2 ⊃ P1 = A
• ∀ i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, Pi ∪ {(ri, ci, ei)} = Pi+1
• Pi ∪ {(ri, ci, ei)} is not a partial Latin Square such that ∄e ∈ N {ei}
Definition 2.4. A critical set is referred to as being semi-strong, if there exists a set {P1, . . . , Pm}
of m = n2 − |A| partial Latin Squares, of order n, which satisfy the following properties:
1. L ⊃ Pm ⊃ Pm−1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ P2 ⊃ P1 = A
2. ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, Pi ∪{(ri, ci; ei)} = Pi+1 such that one of Pi ∪{(ri, ci; ei} or Pi ∪ {(ri, c; ei}
or Pi∪{(r, ci; ei} is not a partial Latin Square for any e ∈ N/{ei}or c ∈ N/{ci} or r ∈ N/{ri}
respectively.
2.1 The Proposed Scheme
In Cooper [3] a secret sharing scheme is constructed with a secret key made from a Latin Square
L, of order n. Furthermore [3] notes the following characteristics:
• The Latin Square L is kept private, but its order however is made public.
• The Shares are based on a partial Latin Square S = {∪Ai|Ai ∈ L} where Ai is a critical set.
With the union is taken over all possible critical sets in L over some subset of critical sets.
• The number of critical sets used depends on the size of the Latin Square and the number of
shares.
• The access structure is defined as Γ = {B|B ⊆ S &A ⊆ B} where A is some critical set in L.
Where Γ is monotone
We shall now outline the basic protocol presented by Cooper [3]:
• A Latin Square L of order n is chosen. The number n is made public, but the Latin Square
L is kept secret and taken to be the key.
• The set S which is the union of a number of critical sets in L
• For each (i, j; k) ∈ S, the share (i, j; k) is distributed privately to a participant.
• When a critical set of shares are brought together, they can reconstruct the Latin Square L
and thus the secret key.
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2.2 The Ranking Problem
The constructions proposed by [3, 11, 1], are such that each user is given one element from a Latin
Square and a subset of these elements may be combined to form a critical set. In Donovan [4], a
more general construction is given such that, a set S is the union of a number of critical sets in a
Latin Square. Elements from the set S are dealt out to each player, so that a group of players wish
to reconstruct the critical set and the secret can be recovered. This gives rise to the question to
that complex issue in Latin Squares of there being some positions which are more important than
others.
An intruder who knew C’s share and the location of the other shares, what the player did next
would depend upon their knowledge of the concurrence scheme. If our player knew the scheme
then one would start by guessing at two of the other shares (A and B, or D and E, or A and D) in
which case it is an disadvantage compared to an intruder who knows a share other than C’s.
If our player does not know the scheme, it would seem most logical to try to guess D’s share before
trying to guess two other shares at once. Again, in this case, our player is at a disadvantage
compared to an intruder who knows a share other than C’s.
2.3 Security of a Latin Square Based Scheme
The main security issues with this type of scheme were investigated heavily by Cooper [3]. We shall
now examine these vulnerabilities:
• An unauthorized players knows one nth of the critical set.
• A group of unauthorized players have a greater chance of reconstructing the critical set with
their group of shares.
• The security of this scheme is based on the number of possible latin squares which contain
the partial Latin Square defined by a disloyal group of players. It has been estimated that the
number of Latin Squares containing the set C for {(i, j; k)} such that for a square of order
n = 11, ≥ 19000000
The complexity of completing partial Latin Squares has been investigated by Colbourn [2]. The
computational complexity of this problem is NP-Complete. However even for a Latin Square of
order n = 11 there are still a measurable number of solutions which can be generated by brute
force.
3 RSA Threshold System
Threshold schemes however are by no means perfect despite their proponents [9]. Many of these
schemes have a great many short falls which include at least one of the following:
1. The scheme has no rigorous security proof
2. Share generation and verification is interactive and requires synchronous communications
network
3. The size of each share increases linearly with respect to the number of players.
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In an effort to rectify this situation [9] presents a new RSA threshold scheme that exhibits the
following:
1. Unforgeable and robust if we assume that the RSA problem is hard [7]
2. Share generation and verification is completely non-interactive [7]
3. The size of the share is bounded by a constant and the size of the discrete logarithm problem
[8] and [6]
Shoup [9] further stresses the fact that the share is a standard RSA signature. This is underpinned
by the fact that the public key and verification algorithm are the same as for an RSA signature
[8, 7]. The refined model examined in this paper and in [9] where there is one threshold t for the
maximum number of traitors and k is the minimum quorum size.
3.1 The RSA threshold Scheme
We must first establish a set of players w, denoted 1, . . . , w, a trusted designer/dealer, and traitor.
This systems also has a signature verification, a share verification and share combining algorithms.
Shoup [9] only uses 2 variables, however in our investigation we must remain consistent with the
majority of the literature and consider 3 parameters. So we denote the number of corrupted players
as c, the number of shares needed to produce a signature as t and the set of all users w. We also
mention the requirement for these parameters is, t ≥ c+ 1 and w − c ≥ t.
The dealing phase is initiated by the dealer generating a public key, along with a set of secret
key shares and a set of verification keys. The corrupt player obtains the secret key shares of the
corrupted players, the public and verification keys. The post dealing phase is when the corrupt
player acts by submitting a signing request to the loyal players for a message. After the request
has been submitted, a player outputs a signature share for the submitted message.
The signature verification algorithm takes an input message, a signature and a public key to de-
termine if the signature is valid. The signature verification algorithm takes an input message, and
signature share on that message from player i, to determine if that signature share is valid. The
share combining algorithm takes a message and t valid signature shares on the message with the
public key and the verification keys. The algorithm then outputs a valid signature on that message.
The non-forgeability of signatures protocol dictates that if an adversary forges a signature at the
end of the protocol our player outputs a valid signature on a message that was not submitted as
a signing request to at least t − c loyal players. Furthermore we must stress that the threshold
signature scheme is non-forgeable if it is computationally infeasible for the corrupt adversary to
forge a signature.
3.2 Security of RSA Threshold
Theorem 3.1. For t = w + 1, in the random oracle model for H ′, the above protocol is a secure
threshold signature scheme which is robust and non-forgeable. Thus we assume that the standard
RSA signature scheme is secure.
We shall only outline a very short comment on the proof for this theorem. One should consult Shoup
[9] for a more detailed approach. The robustness of the threshold signature scheme is cemented
in its non-forgeable. We assume that the standard RSA signature scheme is secure because of the
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difficulty in solving the adaptive message attack. This statement can be justified by the random
oracle model of [6] such that given some random x ∈ Z∗n, it is hard to compute y such that y
e = x
4 Analysis
We shall put forward the merits of a Latin Square SSS and the RSA based system to examine
• A Latin Square Scheme, can provide good security when the critical set on which the scheme
is founded is not based on strong critical or semi-strong critical partial Latin Squares.
• Latin Squares of large order i.e. ≥ 11 provide for a relatively secure system.
• The current literature believes that the RSA problem is hard to compute
• The Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption-given some random g, h ∈ Qn, along with
gn and hb, it is hard to decide if a ≡ b mod m.
• Finding a correct authorized group of shares from one given share is computationally difficult.
If we were to look at a computational attack against the Latin Square Scheme, one would need
only to find one disloyal player and simply generate a completion for that share [1]. Although
the prospect of finding a solution to this problem becomes more difficult as the size of the scheme
increases beyond 11 players [5], it is still possible. Without a scheme that allows for a disenrollment
procedure [5], a brute force attack for computing the completion of the Latin Square is a viable
attack.
If one already holds one of the other share then, there is a 1 in 4 chance of completing the critical
set and discovering the secret by simply picking one share at random [3]. A 25 percent chance
of completing a critical set given one player is disloyal, is a risk not worth taking in our view. If
one player were somehow compelled or convinced that becoming disloyal was appropriate then a
scheme that placed so much trust in one player is too risky.
Although the Latin Square model is entirely theoretical, it must be asked why one would use such
a scheme that has two major faults. Unless one can ensure that no players will defect and become
disloyal, then this scheme is far from desirable. In contrast RSA based protocols are one of the
best methods available to ensure the security of a multiparty scheme for digital signatures [6, 9].
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